The History Of Scotland - Volume 11: From The Jacobite Rising To The Secession - Andrew Lang - ebook

The History Of Scotland - Volume 11: From The Jacobite Rising To The Secession ebook

Andrew Lang

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This is volume 11, covering the time from the Jacobite rising to the Secession. In many volumes of several thousand combined pages the series "The History of Scotland" deals with something less than two millenniums of Scottish history. Every single volume covers a certain period in an attempt to examine the elements and forces which were imperative to the making of the Scottish people, and to record the more important events of that time.

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The History Of Scotland – Volume 11

From The Jacobite Rising To The Secession

Andrew Lang

Contents:

The Jacobite Rising. 1714-1715.

The End Of The Rising Of 1715.

The Sequelae Of The Rising. 1716-1717.

Foreign Affairs. The Story Of Clementina. 1716-1719.

Heresy And Schism. 1720-1740.

The Secession. Patronage. Witchcraft. 1736-1809.

THE HISTORY OF SCOTLAND – VOLUME 11, Andrew Lang

Jazzybee Verlag Jürgen Beck

86450 Altenmünster, Loschberg 9

Germany

ISBN: 9783849604561

www.jazzybee-verlag.de

[email protected]

THE JACOBITE RISING. 1714-1715.

IN the event of the failure of romantic schemes for carrying James, with a price on his head, to England, reconciling him with Queen Anne, and presenting him to Parliament, Berwick had thought that the king should hurry to Scotland as soon as the queen expired (Dec. 24, 1713). De Torcy promised to have ships in readiness. It was then expected that England would pay the dowry of Mary of Modena, and the money would be used for the invasion. But the dowry was never paid: seventy years later it was asked for in vain. Mary had sold almost all her jewels; money was vainly hoped for from the Pope; the gold of the King of Spain arrived in December 1715, too late to be useful; and the presents given by Marlborough amounted to only four thousand pounds. Never was there a more hopeless enterprise than the Rising of 1715. High hopes of money and men from Charles XII. of Sweden arose, and were dashed in the usual style. On October 20, 1714, James sent a message to Scotland which clears up the nature of his position at that time. On October 4 he had sent news that he had been making all diligence to appear among his friends when he heard that Atholl, whom he looked on as the head of his party, had gone to pay court to George. Breadalbane had induced the chiefs of the great clans to send to Mar a letter in which they expressed their fidelity and submission to the Elector of Hanover. No doubt James was well informed, and Mar, though pointedly neglected by George, forwarded the letter of the chiefs whom he was presently to lead in the Rising of 1715, if Mar can be spoken of as a leader. James thought that Mar's present step was only intended for their immediate security, but the Bishop of Edinburgh, speaking for the Lowland gentry, advised him not to stir. Meanwhile he expressed vague hopes, and a resolution to break " the shameful Union." Late in November 1714 Berwick advised James to tell his friends in Scotland that he was resolved to be with them, accompanied by Berwick, whose military reputation would have made all the difference to his prestige. At the moment James was negotiating with adherents in England, "without which little good is to be expected." Meanwhile the Scottish Jacobites must keep quiet, and avoid exciting the suspicions of the Government, as some tipsy revellers in Edinburgh probably failed to do by their nocturnal proclamations of King James. 

The chief friend in England was the Duke of Ormonde, who was believed to have great influence with the soldiery. Ormonde, through a Mrs. Bagnal, one of the fair intriguers whose name was legion, had in 1713-1714 given some kind of pledge to James. On January 1, 1715, Berwick was not unhopeful of a joint effort by his uncle, Marlborough, and the Duke of Ormonde, though he might have known his uncle's character better. He had, indeed, been neglected by George I., and he had sent to James a little of his savings, but, a traitor to the father, he would not risk himself in the forlorn cause of the son. On January 6 Berwick induced Lady Jersey (la jolie) to engage Bolingbroke as James's agent in England. Though Marlborough's letters contained " only the usual bantering expressions," he still sent small sums of money during the summer of 1715, and the best use was made of them in paying the crews of the ships which had been secured.

Meanwhile Mar was in correspondence with Glengarry and the Highland chiefs (February 15[-26], 1715). He congratulated them on the seemliness of their recent behaviour, and was employing Campbell of Glendaruel, by no means a gentleman of Hanoverian principles. Mar, who had been Secretary for Scotland, on August 30, 1714, sent a letter of humble loyalty to George. Though pointedly neglected by that prince, he was "his most dutiful, most obedient subject and servant." He had brought the Highlands to make a protestation of their allegiance, and he hoped, "vainly, for reward.

Meanwhile money was sent to Ormonde in England, and, on March 13, 1715, James appointed him Captain-General in the three kingdoms. His commission arrived safely in April, and Berwick -hoped that the Duke would determine to " stand butt " (sic: probably "stand buff") "in England against the Elector." The Swedish scheme was in hand (March - August 1715), and only swelled the list of disappointments. It was hoped that the celebrated Protestantism of Charles XII. would pacify anxious minds in England. Dreams of exiles! Berwick (February 17, 1715) thought that Ormonde was expecting James "to carry with him that able lawyer, M. Alexandra," that is, an army of invasion, which was impossible, as France would not imperil the peace, though ready to connive at private enterprise. 

In April, James's proposed agent in England, Bolingbroke, arrived in Paris after a hasty flight from London. La jolie. Lady Jersey, was now " of no use, however well-meaning." Ormonde, Berwick said, would have to care for his own preservation: it was hoped that he would " stand buff," as we have seen, but, as he would not dissemble, and distrusted his own power of raising the west against George, he, too, some months later, made his way to France. Even before this collapse of hopes, Berwick (July 2) found that the French Court would not permit him, a field -marshal of France, to accompany James in his little invasion. Here a curious point must be explained. In 1715 there arose a fatal breach between James and that great soldier and good man, his natural brother, the Duke of Berwick. In October 1704 Berwick, with the permission of James, a boy of fifteen, was naturalised as a French subject, and became a Marechal de France. As such he must obey the ruler of France, not James; yet, in 1715, James displays a seemingly unreasonable irritation because Berwick obeys the Regent d'Orteans, not himself. The fact is that, in 1704, Lord Caryll, acting for James, consulted an English lawyer, Robert Power, who gave the opinion that Berwick's naturalisation in no way relieved him of his inalienable duty to King James. The documents are given at the end of this chapter. Thus James remained convinced that, under the saving clauses of his permission to Berwick to be naturalised, he retained Berwick's allegiance, when his claim clashed with that of France. James now remonstrated with the Ministers of Louis XIV., who suggested that Berwick might steal away after James's own departure. On July 14 Berwick wrote to the effect that it was now or never, James must cross the Channel. Louis XIV. would regret the missing of this opportunity. Already James had met Bolingbroke (who thought him eager but vague, as was natural), and appointed him Minister.

Now we come to the very crisis of the enterprise, the main cause of all the ruin. On July 16 Berwick wrote to James saying that "his honour was at stake, his friends will give over the game if they think him backward, as no doubt they will. In short, no delay must come from his side." On July 19 James told Bolingbroke that he had good news from Ormonde: " You will see the necessity of losing no time." On the same day Berwick had received the " good news " which James had sent off to him, through Father Innes, and was aware that James was to start on July 28, and had appointed the Rising for August 10. He would be at Dieppe by July 30. Berwick asked whether August 10 was Old Style or New Style, there was every chance of fatal confusion. Moreover, said Berwick, they ought not to fix a day without hearing more certainly from Ormonde. James was acting, we shall see, on news from a. certain Father Callaghan, not evidential. Now, on July 14 Berwick had told de Torcy that James must act at once, adding, in the spirit of prophecy, that otherwise "he might make himself Cardinal, for he would never be king." What really occurred was this: James, having been urged by Berwick to instant action, on receiving news from Ormonde through Father Callaghan, did act on it at once,, without waiting to consult Berwick and Bolingbroke. He sent, about July 15, a messenger to Mar in London, fixing August 10 for the Rising, and Berwick knew this by July 19. But by July 26 James had received a memoir from Mar and Ormonde of a tenor very different from Callaghan's message from Ormonde, on which he had acted by fixing August 10. This Callaghan was a Dominican,, a man of good sense, says Berwick, and Berwick admits that he did come from Ormonde with the message to start at once. The initial fault, it thus seems, was with Ormonde.

James may well have been puzzled and provoked. Now he was told that he could not be too prompt, and again, that he could not be too cautious. Was he so incautious and so furtive as to bid Mar raise the standard without communicating his action to Bolingbroke and Berwick? Berwick says that Mar, in September, received a secret order from James to go to Scotland at once and take up arms. " Neither Bolingbroke nor I knew anything of this, though we were the king's chief Ministers." But Mar went, it is known, to a levee of George I. on August 1: he retired to Scotland on August 2, he held a large gathering of chiefs on August 27, and raised the standard on September 6. All this cannot have been done in obedience to a secret order of James received in September! Now, after he had raised the standard, Mar produced a commission from James dated September 7, and with a blank for the names of his Council, " not to be filled up," he said, " unless there be an absolute necessity for it." Such a commission, of September 7, did not prompt Mar's measures of August 2-September 6. On September 23 James wrote to Bolingbroke hoping that the Scots would wait for a despatch from himself. It is suggested that he merely meant to deceive Bolingbroke; but we need not resort to so deplorable a theory merely on the evidence, certainly erroneous, of Berwick's Memoirs. Nobody ever knew what commission, if any, Mar had from James before that of September 7, which was partly in blank until circumstances required it to be filled up. If news reached Mar in July (not in September, as Berwick says) that James was to be at Dieppe on July 30, and that he had fixed August 10, and that message was sent, certainly Berwick blundered in his dates. Memoirs are most untrustworthy sources, but James's character suffers for Berwick's misstatement.

The haste of James, in the circumstances described and under the urgency of Berwick, was natural but mistaken. But by July 26 he had, as we know, a new despatch, from Mar and Ormonde, of July 5-16, a paper showing that Ormonde and Mar saw nothing but difficulties in the enterprise which Berwick was then urging James to undertake instantly. There was no chance of success, English Jacobites were unanimous in holding, unless the king came with a regular army. In a month or six weeks George could put 32,000 good troops in the field. If James meant to come with no army and risk all, he should arrive at the beginning of October, and a choice of places at Holy Island, at Alnwick, in Forfar, or near Aberdeen was suggested. The Highlands could supply 8000 good men, but, if unpaid, they would live on the country and ruin the Cause. It was hoped that James would go to a Protestant church every Sunday, a thing out of the question. If the king judged the occasion ripe (and they had proved that it was the reverse), Mar and Ormonde would back him. Charles Kinnaird carried this important despatch. There came, too, on July 26 a letter from Bolingbroke at Paris, of July 23. He affected to be surprised that "women over their tea" prattled about "arms provided and ships got ready," as if in any society, above all in a society full of excited priests and women, any such measures could long be kept secret. The English Government already had ships cruising on the French northern coast. Bolingbroke suspected that Father Callaghan was a spy: he was not, according to Berwick. Callaghan's message from Ormonde was, in terms, the reverse of what Ormonde said to the French ambassador in England, Bolingbroke remarked; but Ormonde's moods varied from day to day.

On July 26 James answered Bolingbroke's letter of July 23, applauding his " solid reason," and enclosing, for what it might be worth, a warrant for an earldom. He was puzzled by Bolingbroke's cypher, however. He sent back Kinnaird, the bearer of Mar's and Ormonde's memoir, with that discouraging document. If Bolingbroke and Berwick were doing their best, though he wished to set out he would leave himself in their hands. He adds, and this is important, " What requires most haste now is the sending to Scotland to contradict Lord John Drummond's message." Now what was that message? The MSS. do not inform us. But it must have been James's message urging on Mar an early rising, on the strength of Callaghan's news from Ormonde (about July 15). Thus by July 19 James's hasty message was known to Bolingbroke and Berwick, despite the statement of Berwick in his Memoirs. James was, on July 26, giving pressing orders for it to be countermanded more than a month before Mar raised the standard on September 6. Berwick knew perfectly that James had fixed August 10, as we have seen. He knew it by July 19. Bolingbroke also knew it, and now actually sent Allan Cameron to Mar to give countermanding orders, as James writes to Bolingbroke on August 2, adding that nothing can yet be settled. The king's character is thus cleared from the double charge of folly in ordering too early a rising, for he at once countermanded the order, and of perfidy in hiding what he had done from Bolingbroke and Berwick. As we shall see later, some accident delayed Cameron, and Mar raised the standard on September 6. This also was an act of unpardonable folly. After despatching the memoir of July 6-17 from himself and Ormonde, pointing out the hopeless condition of affairs, Mar, obviously, should not have acted on James's hasty message of about July 15 fixing the day for August 10. Mar should have waited for a reply to his own despatch of July 6-17. He cannot have been ignorant, long before he raised the standard, of Ormonde's flight to France of about August 2 or 3; and knowing that the English Jacobites were now leaderless, he did an insensate thing in raising the Highlands in September.

The blame of all the ruin and misery falls on Ormonde if he sent Callaghan, as Berwick says; in some degree on Berwick for suggesting that James's honour was at stake; on James for acting instantly on July 15, four days before his report to his Ministers; and above all on the stupid recklessness of Mar, who set out for Scotland in face of his own unanswered despatch of July 6-17, and who persevered in spite of Ormonde's secession. Finally came the accident to Cameron, delaying James's second message to Scotland.

These causes produced the premature movements and the wretched fiasco of 1715.

To touch on a personal matter: On August 2 James casually annihilates Thackeray's tale that " Queen Oglethorpe " was his Sultana and ruler at Bar, in Lorraine. Writing from Bar, he says to Bolingbroke, " Here is a long letter to myself from Mistress Oglethorpe. The first part is very odd, and I can make no answer to it without your advice. The rest of it is most of it stuff." On August 3 Bolingbroke reports his despatch of Cameron to Scotland " to prevent any precipitate measure." Bolingbroke had met Berwick, and communicated everything to him. De Torcy was promising help with Louis XIV.; the Court of France was as favourable as it dared to be. Meanwhile (August 5) Bolingbroke agreed with James's opinion of Miss Oglethorpe's political letter. The lady had herself invented part of it (such is apt to be " pretty Fanny's way "), and was communicating in the other part the ideas of a person who had put himself in a position where he could be of no service.

The Oglethorpe ladies were said by the Whigs to be the sisters, or one or another of them was declared to be the mistress, of James. They were all pretty; they were all loyal; and as late as 1754 were engaged in the most romantic and dangerous Jacobite plots. But the letters both of James and, later, his son show that the Oglethorpean counsels were regarded as tedious and ludicrous, though, as Bolingbroke remarks, " it is certainly right to disgust nobody " by excess of candid criticism.

James was impatient to be doing something; but with the sad lucidity of his character and experience, he thought Bolingbroke and Berwick much too sanguine in their expectations from the French king, who, as Queen Mary writes to Dicconson, " is, I am confident, neither in a condition nor a disposition of giving any succours." The king's mother, at Saint Germains, was poor and very ill. He had promised not to move for a month, but after that, as the discontents in England and Scotland were great (send-mental tumults on James's birthday), he was disposed to risk all by the venture of his single person (August 6). He believed that his secrets were safe, being known only to himself, Bolingbroke, Berwick, Middleton, Sir Thomas Higgons, and the queen. His subjects at home detested Middleton, and what the queen knew might reach priests and ladies. James suspected that one Ogilvie, " who had formerly enough the air of a spy," was hovering about, possibly Harley's spy, Ogilvie, one of Dundee's officers.

On August 7 Bolingbroke said that James was probably aware of the arrival in Paris of Ormonde, who had fled from England. Ormonde had let the party know of his resolve, in case of danger, to retire to the west of England, where he would be joined by many retired officers. He had relays of horses on the road, and intelligence with the towns of Plymouth, Exeter, and Bristol, which he meant to occupy as places d'armes. Berwick believes that he might have succeeded, and even been joined by part of the English army, so generally beloved was the Duke; but, though very brave, genius and knowledge of war were lacking to him. Ormonde heard that he was to be arrested, and fled to the coast without leaving even a message for his subordinates. Ormonde's flight discouraged the French Court. It had been admitted that he and the English Jacobites were indispensable to the enterprise. Yet Bolingbroke (August 7) could tell James that while Marlborough was wavering, Shrewsbury had been engaged, "which I think a considerable article." If this be true, Shrewsbury was the most vacillating of politicians. James was writing (August 11) to Mar, apparently in ignorance of his movements in Scotland. Indeed Mar had not yet (August 11) gone farther than Fifeshire, where he met some friends, and whence he went slowly northward to Braemar.

De Pontchartrain hoped to have ships for James ready by the end of August, so Berwick wrote (August 13). The whole state of affairs, in fact, demanded the cessation of the crazy enterprise, above all as the health of Louis XIV. already caused Berwick and Bolingbroke anxiety. But Berwick thought it wise to set Miss Olive Trant, a Jacobite beauty, " to make the overture " to the Due d'Orleans, who would be Regent if Louis died. Bolingbroke, in his famous letter to Sir William Windham, speaks of Olive Trant's intrigues as if he was a disgusted spectator, whereas we see that the girl was the chosen instrument of his own associate, Berwick. But d'Orleans never allowed his mistresses to have knowledge of or influence in his political enterprises. It is probably not Miss Trant to whom Bolingbroke himself refers (August 15) as one who " has as much ambition and cunning as any woman I ever knew, and perhaps as any man." She suggested a marriage between James and a daughter of d'Orleans, and Bolingbroke thought that there was something serious in the idea. " I would have even the pleasures and amusements of my life subservient to your Majesty's service." It appears that this lady was one of the pleasures and amusements: she expressed "personal concern" for the statesman. It may be remarked as a proof of the wisdom of these politicians that their cypher in Arabic numerals was of the flimsiest, and could have been read by any curious schoolboy. The worst news was that an accident had befallen Cameron, who carried the message to countermand Mar's Rising, and Kinnaird was afraid to go to Scotland. This "accident" probably, by delaying the arrival of Cameron's message to Scotland, was the chief cause of Mar's premature venture. Bolingbroke now convinced James that Shrewsbury would stand by him it seems to have been Lady Westmoreland's news: the ladies were very eager. The Duke of Leeds offered his allegiance, " a madman," said the sensible Bolingbroke. On August 30 he announced the death of Louis XIV., another fatal blow, if a coup de grace were needed.

There was a gleam of light from the South. Spain was to furnish 400,000 crowns; but the Spanish bills could not be negotiated in France, and the specie was for three months on the road. The new Regent, d'Orleans, wished to be friendly, but could not risk a war with England. On September 3 James Murray informed the king that Mar was in Scotland, but was very uneasy because he had no authority to act. He asked for a commission with a blank space for the names of his coadjutors, and this he called, when he received it, his " new commission." He had no previous commission, as was suspected in Scotland at the time. He thought that Atholl should not be trusted. As usual, AtholFs son, Lord Tullibardine, "went out," while the Duke remained true to the Hanoverian cause. For five hundred years almost this arrangement had been "common form " in Scotland. Mar could rely on the Earl Marischal, brother of the James Keith later so famous as Field -Marshal of Frederic the Great. The Earl Marischal was, for forty years, to be a prominent Jacobite, who never did anything in particular, and was always expected to do everything. A humourist and a philosopher, he ceased to believe in the Cause long before he deserted it.

Bolingbroke began (September 10) to express a kind of despair of action. Messages to England and Scotland were intercepted; the party in France and at home were in the dark. Mar was beginning to move in this fog, and we must leave the conspirators in France to follow his operations in Scotland.

He opened with a great hunting in Braemar (August 26), at which Huntly, eldest son of the Duke of Gordon, the Marquis of Tullibardine, Nithsdale, Marischal, Traquair, Errol, Southesk, Carnwath,. Seaforth, Linlithgow, Kenmure, Strathallan, Ogilvie, Nairne, Glengarry, and others, are reported to have been present. From Galloway to Knoydart, from Ken to Dee, chiefs and nobles were gathered, but their names no longer meant what they did in the days of Mary and of James VI. Mar made a speech full of flourishing promises of arms, money, and the king's arrival, and is said to have shown the commission for want of which, we know, he was "in great uneasiness." His audience went home to raise their men, and the standard was set up at Braemar on September 6. Marischal proclaimed the king at Aberdeen, Tullibardine at Dunkeld, Graham of Duntroon at Dundee, and Brigadier Mackintosh at Inverness. Mar (September 9-20) found his own tenants especially reluctant to rise, and threatened to burn their houses. This was the process known as "hounding out," that they were "hounded out" was the usual plea of the Highland prisoners at their trials. At Inverness Mackintosh, with 500 men, seized and garrisoned the bridge over the Ness, securing communications with the northern counties, where Sutherland, the Mackays, and the Munros were Whigs.

To surprise Edinburgh Castle was an inevitable part of every Jacobite plot, and on September 8 Lord John Drummond made the attempt. Some of the garrison had been won over to let down rope-ladders from the wall on the west side. In case of success, three rounds of artillery were to be fired in the castle, and beacons were to telegraph the news to Mar. A Mr. Arthur, who was in the plot, told his brother, whose wife wormed the secret out of him and sent it to Cockburn of Ormiston, of a family active on the godly side since 1559. Ormiston was Lord Justice-Clerk, and, whether in the way described or another, he got the news, and sent it to Colonel Stuart, commanding in the castle. The conspirators were surprised while arranging the rope-ladders, and the assailants fled, leaving a Captain Maclean, bruised by a fall. Two or three others were captured. They were probably drunk. According to a well-known story, they had dallied, "powdering their hair," at a tavern, and had overstayed the appointed hour, a circumstance natural and usual, but regretted by all friends of romance.

The proceedings of Government, in the way of preparation, were more prosaic if more successful. It was not difficult to succeed against opponents who knew not their right hand from their left. A reward of £100,000 for "the Pretender," if he tried to land in the country, had for a year been offered. This, as Prince Charles observed thirty years later, was a measure unusual among Christian princes. Conceivably the knowledge that he was priced at this flattering sum may have determined James to his very undignified flight from his own army in the following year. Such offers of reward were thrown away upon the native rectitude of the clans, but were tempting to Presbyterian ministers like the two Macaulays later, and to Lowland and other adventurers. At the end of July Robert Walpole had moved an address to George I. on the topic of national defence. Supplies were voted, and a hasty attempt to double the regular army in England was made by levies of 7000 men, in addition to 8000 under arms. Mar and Ormonde, in July, had reckoned the English army at 8000, and to these they could have opposed as many of the clans, without artillery, and with but a few Lowland horse. But they calculated that George would bring 24,000 from Ireland, Holland, and Hanover, and volunteers behind stone walls would be useful. In Scotland, Government had less than 2000 regulars, whom General Wightman concentrated at Stirling. The castle there was impregnable to the clans, save by surprise, and "Forth bridles the wild Highlandman." The fords of Frew are dangerous and are easily guarded, and Mar was no Montrose to march and turn the river in difficult country, guarded by the clan of Argyll. Montrose would have begun, as of old, by " discussing Argyll," not now such an easy task when Red John of the Battles, not Gillespie Gruamach, led the children of Diarmaid. The Macgregors of the Lennox were, indeed, reckoned among Mar's allies, but the notorious Rob Roy was a client of Argyll, receiving "wood and water" from him, safe from the law in his cottage in Glenshira, and quite untrammelled by any regard for either king. The nameless clan owed no goodwill or loyalty to any Government, and, as far as influenced by Rob Roy, consulted solely its own interests.

The westland Whigs and Presbyterians were checked in their desire to form armed associations in defence of their liberty and religion: the same distrust was exhibited by England in 1745. But Edinburgh, Glasgow, and other towns raised companies of volunteers, and the men of pleasant Teviotdale armed, though, degenerate Borderers, they " made but a faint appearance " when it came to business. On September 9 Argyll left London for the north as commander-in-chief, as well qualified by courage, skill, and experience for the post as Mar was conspicuously the reverse. The preachers acted as recruiting officers, and the westland Whigs were eager to meet their old oppressors of the Highland host. Under Ferguson of Craigdarroch they marched to support the regulars at Stirling and to garrison towers commanding the line of Forth, while the Duchess of Hamilton lent her tenants to the cause not favoured by her late husband. The Whig nobles were Argyll, the Duke of Douglas, who had little or none of the old Douglas power, Morton, Roxburghe, Annandale, Stair, Loudoun, and others. Suspected nobles and gentlemen were summoned to appear at Edinburgh, among them Campbell of Auchenbreck, Campbell of Glendaruel of the Breadalbane kin, and Campbell of Lochnell, the first cadet of Argyll, for the Campbells were by no means universally subject to their chief, and the House of Lochnell, as long ago at Glenrinnes, was often in opposition. Out of some sixty gentlemen, only two surrendered, one of them being Lockhart's ally, Sir Alexander Erskine, the Lord Lyon of the Herald's Orifice. Lockhart had provided horses and arms, but found himself little trusted by the military leaders, and, for various confused reasons, was now in prison, now under surveillance. His brother led his men, and was later taken prisoner and shot, dying with grace and courage. In England vigorous measures were taken, and suspected gentlemen were locked up.

Meanwhile Mar learned that Rothes, with the Whigs of Fife, was marching to occupy Perth; He himself had about 1000 men at Dunkeld. Tullibardine's Atholl contingent, with the aged Breadalbane's from Glenorchy, came in, some 2000 under Glendaruel and Glenlyon, and joined him. He sent John Hay, brother of Lord Kinnoull, to seize Perth, which was easily done, and Mar was master of the east, from Fife to Aberdeen. Perth was his headquarters till the end came, and with Huntly's, Seaforth's, Marischal's, Mackintosh's men, and the clans of the west, he is thought to have been at the head of 12,000 broadswords.

Montrose or Dundee never had such an army, and, with Montrose or Dundee to lead, they would soon have taken Edinburgh and joined hands with the Jacobites of Cumberland and Lancashire. But Mar dallied, probably awaiting James, whom he expected to come with supplies, on which the English Government caused the Regent to lay an embargo. Mar's delay was another piece of fatal folly: James might as well have been awaited at Edinburgh or in England. On the other hand, the dilatory Mar allowed the enterprise to be wasted and ruined before the king came, and added his melancholy to the general sense of discomfiture.

It is not uninteresting to know what a private citizen thought of the aspect of affairs, which in Scotland was certainly not encouraging to Whigs, in September-October. Wodrow was reckoned nervous, "a feared fool," but writes, "The Providence of Scotland's God has been adorable at this very juncture " in causing the death of Louis XIV. This was one of "the magnalia Dei in behalf of poor Scotland " that is, of Whiggish Scotland. Louis being dead, Wodrow could not understand the action of Mar, except on the ground that he had committed himself and wanted company in his situation. Wodrow was much comforted by the western volunteers at Glasgow, and by the permission of the Regent to Byng to search ships coming from Havre to Scotland. On the whole, considering that Argyll had not 2000 men, and that the minister of Eastwood was naturally anxious, he took a sensible view of the posture of affairs.

Meanwhile, in September, James and Bolingbroke knew little of what was occurring. A mournful message to England was carried by Ezekiel Hamilton. The Regent had caused the ships at Havre to be unloaded of their arms and supplies; the money from Spain was likely to be long delayed, but the king would go to Scotland at all hazards if the Highlands had really risen, which was uncertain. By September 23 James still hoped that the Scots would do nothing hasty, as has already been shown, in reference to the delay of his message of the end of July. He had never believed in the Swedish aid: money had been wasted in that quarter. " The Swedish king's reply is both reasonable and unanswerable, though very unfortunate for me," remarks James, with his natural sad lucidity. An adventurer who hopes for little and regards a disappointing reply as unanswerable because it is " reasonable," is obviously not born to success in politics. " On the whole, I must confess my affairs have a very melancholy prospect." He did not see how the Regent could possibly avoid stopping and unlading his ships in short, James saw things as they were, clearly and with resignation. But he conceived that honour demanded his presence in Scotland.

To the world James will ever be the witty, wild, faithless, amorous prince of Thackeray's creation. We see what manner of man he really was, not one who played tennis or tipsified himself with ratifia in the company of "Queen Oglethorpe," but a sober, diligent, reasonable, sad young man; affectionate, depressed, true to creed and honour. Bolingbroke was more sanguine than James, and Berwick seems to have put more faith than Bolingbroke in letters describing the apprehensions of the English Government and a fall in stocks. To Bolingbroke the writer of the letters seemed to possess more zeal than knowledge, and more imaginationthan judgment. Even now (September 25) Mar's commission was dubious, and Bolingbroke desired that one should be drawn up "with a blank for the commander-in-chief." As Berwick did not mean to appear, the blank could not easily be filled up. Mar was incompetent, and probably the titled Jacobites would have declined to serve under Glengarry. Bolingbroke looked forward to the rise of "a new set of compounders with Government," nor was he deceived.

Meanwhile Berwick insisted that James must depart instantly for Scotland: the journey through France might not easily be accomplished in safety. Berwick would be "sensibly mortified" if not permitted to follow the king. James replied that nobody could hinder Berwick from going if he wished to go. Berwick (October 7) answered that he " was not his own master." Now James, for the reasons already given (p. 175), regarded his brother as his subject: this difference of opinion was incurable. On October 7 Bolingbroke declared that the Regent would certainly connive at James's proceedings. Otherwise, if James were in England or Scotland he would be cut off from all communication with the Continent; only the connivance of the Regent could avert that danger.