Entertainment - Droit, Médias, Art, Culture 2017/1 -  - ebook

Entertainment - Droit, Médias, Art, Culture 2017/1 ebook

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Découvrez le sommaire de ce premier numéro et l'article "Pourquoi une nouvelle revue ?"
Discover the table of contents of this first issue and the article "Why a New Publication?"

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Cette version numérique de l’ouvrage a été réalisée pour le Groupe Larcier.

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© Groupe Larcier s.a., 2017

Éditions Bruylant

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Il est interdit, sauf accord préalable et écrit de l’éditeur, de reproduire (notamment par photocopie) partiellement ou totalement le présent ouvrage, de le stocker dans une banque de données ou de le communiquer au public, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit.

ISBN : 978-2-8027-5903-4.

Sommaire

Table of Contents

Éditorial | Editorial

Pourquoi une nouvelle revue ?

Why a New Publication?

Eric Canal Forgues Alter

Instantané | Snapshot

Big Brother

Orwell de Steve Ullathorne

Pascale Privey

Analyses | Analysis

Copyright, droit d’auteur

Breaking Down the Barrier Separating Copyright From droit d’auteur (Part 1)

David Nimmer

Millenials & Médias

Un avenir à co-écrire | Co-Writing the Future

Judith Andrès

Séquences | Clips

Succession Picasso : Penser différent | Picasso Estate: Think Different

L’héritage culturel de Pablo Picasso | The Cultural Legacy of Pablo Picasso

Claudia Andrieu

Honni soit qui mal y pense

Responsabilité des portails d’actualités et commentaires d’internautes : bilan de la jurisprudence européenne

Delphine Dero-Bugny

Mais qui est le père ? | But Who Is the Father?

Robert Fletcher and Bartlow Gallery Ltd v. Peter Doig

Case No. 1:13-CV-03270, N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016

Caroline Brancheriau

Jeu vidéo : œuvre complexe ? | Video Game: A Complex Work?

TGI Lyon, 8 septembre 2016, Raynal c. Atari

Marine Gueudré

Comptes rendus | Review

Veille | Watch

Éditorial | Editorial

Eric CANAL FORGUES ALTER

Rédacteur en chef / Editor-in-Chief

Pourquoi une nouvelle revue ?

Ernest Cassirer 1 constate que la réalité physique s’efface au fur et à mesure que se développe la dimension symbolique de l’homme. Les images, les formes et les rites véhiculés par les médias orientent notre vision et nos connaissances de telle sorte que l’homme n’a plus de rapport direct avec les choses. Ce qu’il ne peut plus voir ou appréhender lui permet en revanche de converser tout le temps avec lui-même.

C’est ce rapport à l’homme incontournable qui rend utile, et même indispensable, la connaissance du projet exclusif qu’est devenu le divertissement, l’entertainment.

On se rappelle la remarque de Bernard Shaw la première fois qu’il vit les lumières de Broadway et de la 42e Rue. Cela doit être beau, dit-il, quand on ne sait pas lire. À plus forte raison quand la lecture n’est pas un obstacle ! Un délice visuel ou auditif, une émotion artistique se doivent d’être expliqués et décodés car leurs implications juridiques et économiques peuvent être considérables.

La création étant aussi anticipation, et les nouveaux moyens de communication n’étant pas seulement des extensions ou amplifications de médias plus anciens, la pensée en « rétroviseur » (Marshall McLuhan) qui tendrait à expliquer que toute nouveauté est une continuation de la culture traditionnelle ne suffit plus, compte tenu de la façon dont les médias nouveaux contribuent à redéfinir les discours tant publics que privés.

Ceux à qui cette nouvelle revue est destinée constituent l’orchestre de ce monde mouvant que forment les médias, l’art et, plus généralement, la culture. Les juristes, mais aussi les professionnels des médias, du cinéma, de la littérature, du théâtre, de l’art, de la musique ou encore de la mode, sont à même d’établir et de multiplier les passerelles avec les enjeux juridiques, politiques, économiques et sociaux liés aux moyens de création et de diffusion de la culture.

Entertainment se propose d’être un journal d’esprit et de dimension internationaux. Fruit d’une collaboration pluridisciplinaire, il entend donner la priorité à l’étude de domaines en grande mutation et à l’analyse des tendances en matière de médias et d’industries créatives.

En soulignant tous les deux mois les enjeux et en interrogeant les conséquences des législations et jurisprudences dans l’ensemble de ces domaines, plusieurs rubriques permettront d’avoir une vision globale des secteurs couverts au travers d’articles de fond et d’analyses sectorielles, de commentaires de textes et de décisions, mais aussi d’opinions, de témoignages ou de visions critiques. Une approche clairement prospective servira de grille d’analyse des éventuelles répercussions juridiques, pratiques, économiques et sociétales.

Voir par exemple dans la rubrique « Instantané » de ce numéro inaugural la façon dont la sombre vision de Georges Orwell dans 1984 (1948) est détournée par Steve Ullathorne et donne corps, a contrario, à la fameuse remarque d’Aldous Huxley dans Retour au meilleur des mondes (1958) selon laquelle les défenseurs des libertés et de la raison, qui sont toujours en alerte pour s’opposer à la tyrannie, « ne tiennent pas compte de cet appétit quasi insatiable de l’homme pour les distractions ».

Why a New Publication?

Ernest Cassirer 2 noted that physical reality seems to recede in proportion as man’s symbolic activity advances. The images, forms and rites conveyed by the media direct our vision and knowledge in such a way that man no longer has a direct relationship with things. Conversely, what he can no longer see or grasp enables him to converse with himself all the time.

It is this vital relationship with man which makes the knowledge of the exclusive project that has become entertainment useful and even indispensable.

George Bernard Shaw’s remark upon seeing the lights on Broadway and 42nd Street comes to mind. It must be beautiful, he said, if you do not know how to read. All the more reason when you can read! A feast for the eyes and ears, an artistic emotion must be explained and decoded, because the legal and economic implications can be considerable.

Creation is also anticipation, and as the new means of communication are not merely extensions or amplifications of the older media, the “rear mirror view” (Marshall McLuhan) which would tend to underscore that every novelty is a continuation of traditional culture no longer suffices – for it would mean ignoring the way that the new media contribute to redefine the public and private discourse.

Those for whom this new review is intended constitute the orchestra of this moving world formed by the media, art and, more generally, culture; law experts but also professionals in the cinema, literature, theatre, art, music, or even fashion, who are capable of establishing and multiplying links with the legal, political, economic and social stakes relating to the means of creating and disseminating culture.

Entertainment is intended as a review for the mind of international scope. A multi-disciplinary cooperative effort, it aims to give priority to the study of rapidly changing fields and the analysis of trends in the media and creative industries.

By underscoring the stakes every two months and examining the consequences of legislation and case law in all these fields, the review will provide an overall view of the sectors covered through in-depth articles and sectoral analyses, comments on texts and decisions, but also opinions, testimonials, or critical visions. A clearly prospective approach will be used as a grid to analyse possible legal, practical, economic, and societal repercussions.

See for instance, under the heading “Snapshot” of this inaugural issue, the way in which the sombre vision of Georges Orwell in 1984 (1948) is diverted by Steve Ullathorne and, conversely, gives expression to the famous remark by Aldous Huxley in Brave New World Revisited (1958) to the effect that civil libertarians and rationalists who are ever on the alert to oppose tyranny “failed to take into account man’s almost infinite appetite for distractions.”

1. E. CASSIRER, Essai sur l’homme, Paris, Minuit, 1976, p. 43.

2. E. CASSIRER, Essai sur l’homme [An Essay on Man], Paris, Minuit, 1976, p. 43.

Instantané | Snapshot

Instantané

Big Brother

Orwell de Steve Ullathorne

Pascale PRIVEY*

* Journaliste indépendante.

Début 2012, une photo de Steve Ullathorne a fait le buzz : elle montre, devant la maison londonienne de feu Georges Orwell, une caméra de surveillance. « Big Brother is watching you »... Se pouvait-il que soit ironiquement installée, juste devant la plaque qui commémore le visionnaire auteur de 1984, l’objet que sa phrase la plus célèbre sert communément à dénoncer ? Rapidement, cependant, on apprit qu’il s’agissait d’un photomontage tiré d’une série, Restyles of the Dead and Famous, dans laquelle on pouvait voir un t-shirt à l’effigie de Che Guevara sécher devant chez Karl Marx, des tournesols devant chez Van Gogh, un piano dans une benne à ordures au domicile de feu Mozart. La photo incriminée était destinée à faire la publicité (efficace !) de l’exposition. La façon dont elle était apparue sur Facebook puis Twitter restait incertaine ; quant aux raisons de son succès…

La question de la véracité est devenue le poncif des réseaux sociaux.

Était-ce bien parce qu’on l’avait crue vraie qu’on l’avait si abondamment partagée ? L’internaute est peu regardant, et prompt à s’emballer. Selon une étude récente 1, 59 % des liens partagés sur Twitter ne sont jamais ouverts. Le partage de documents ne repose pas sur leur analyse, mais constitue une réaction instantanée. Est-ce à dire qu’il est entaché de naïveté, d’imprudence coupable, de stupidité ? Est-il interdit de partager une image parce qu’elle est belle, drôle, révélatrice ? Sûrement pas. Pourquoi le débat s’est-il cristallisé autour de la réalité de cette caméra, alors que le quartier dans lequel se situe cette maison en est de toute façon truffé ? Pourquoi crier à l’intox, et pas au génie publicitaire ? La question de la véracité est devenue le poncif des réseaux sociaux – prompts non seulement à véhiculer des hoax, mais à en fabriquer : distorsion involontaire de l’information, images sans légende, absence de dates… Certains hoax ressurgissent ainsi périodiquement. La rumeur internationale de l’assassinat d’une romancière saoudienne inconnue, Balqees Melhem, par ses frères intégristes, resurgit régulièrement depuis 2013 au moins. Et les gens continuent à s’en indigner ! Ou à faire semblant.

Sur Facebook, sur Twitter, on suit des règles communes, on montre qu’on est civilisé. On cultive le lien en donnant des garanties de conformité. On apprend à ne montrer de soi qu’un visage que tous nos « amis » peuvent et aiment regarder, quitte à refaire dix fois la photo « naturelle » de notre petit-déjeuner. (Une certaine Celeste Barber s’est rendue célèbre en reproduisant dans des conditions de vie normales les photos des comptes Instagram des célébrités. Images ridicules garanties.) On apprend à surveiller ce qu’on dit, et si on s’insurge de quelque chose, c’est qu’on sait que c’est ce qu’on attend de nous. À part quelques trolls mal embouchés cherchant la bagarre, vite mis hors d’état de nuire, nul ne va s’inscrire en faux dans le flux des commentaires et des partages générés par une image. Il est dangereux d’attaquer un ennemi sur ces plateformes, et loin de compter sur leur sens de la répartie, ceux qui s’y risquent lancent sur leurs adversaires la meute de leurs followers ; d’une certaine façon, nous vivons dans une sorte de Moyen-Âge virtuel, férocement collectif, prompt à excommunier les hérétiques comme à organiser des charivaris. La noblesse est conférée par le nombre d’abonnés… et on bannit les condamnés d’un clic.

© Steve Ullathorne photography.

Nous vivons dans une sorte de Moyen-Âge virtuel, férocement collectif, prompt à excommunier les hérétiques comme à organiser des charivaris.

Pourquoi, alors, confondre réseaux sociaux et réseaux d’information ? À vrai dire, ceux qui fabriquent l’information n’ont qu’un souhait : qu’on parle de ce qu’ils écrivent, quoi qu’on en dise. Être commenté, partagé, c’est exister. À l’heure où la presse lutte pour survivre, l’information ne se fait pas contre les rumeurs et les commentaires abscons, mais avec eux. En l’occurrence, d’ailleurs, c’est l’emballement des internautes qui a finalement poussé les journalistes à compter les caméras de surveillance londoniennes et à interviewer le facétieux photographe.

Et tout le monde a été soulagé : non, les Anglais n’avaient pas poussé le sens de l’humour jusqu’à installer l’œil de Big Brother devant les fenêtres de feu son père. Après avoir brièvement symbolisé l’omniprésence de l’État-surveillance, voilà que la photo perdait de son aura effrayante. Il ne s’agissait que d’un coup de pub, d’une blague destinée à mystifier les plus crédules. Amusant…

Mais ce partage massif aurait-il eu lieu si Facebook ne s’en était mêlé ? Plus qu’une caméra dont les enregistrements ne sont jamais regardés, la plateforme incarne parfaitement « Big Brother » : chacun déplore que les données privées y soient contrôlées, jamais effacées, utilisées à des fins mystérieuses. Tandis que les chercheurs de Memlo Park étudient officiellement la contagion massive des émotions via ce réseau, un algorithme gardé secret sélectionne pour nous ce que nous allons voir des publications de nos amis, en dépit des paramètres que nous avons pourtant rentrés dans la machine. 1984, disiez-vous ?

1. M. GABIELKOV, A. RAMACHANDRAN, A. CHAINTREAU, A. LEGOUT, « Social Clicks: What and Who Gets Read on Twitter? », ACM SIGMETRICS / IFIP Performance 2016, Juin 2016, Antibes Juan-les-Pins, France, 2016, <hal-01281190>.

Analyses | Analysis

Analysis

Copyright, droit d’auteur

Breaking Down the Barrier Separating Copyright From droit d’auteur (Part 1)

DavidNIMMER* **

* © 2016 by David Nimmer. ** Professor from Practice at UCLA School of Law and Distinguished Scholar at the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology.

1. – Introducing Disparate Systems

Bernard Edelman characterizes the U.S. copyright system as “purely economic legislation” in which “the author seems to be only a merchant of his work and he keeps a proprietor relationship with it.” 1 In line with that eminent thinker’s point of view, 2 it has become a commonplace that the “French droit d’auteur (author’s right) is a concept far broader than American copyright. While United States copyright seeks to protect primarily the author’s pecuniary and exploitative interests, French law purports to protect the author’s intellectual and moral interests, as well.” 3 Indeed, the droit d’auteur system bows to principles of natural justice rather than simply positive law. 4 Some French scholars go further, attacking American copyright law as “a mere tool of capitalism.” 5 The bottom line is that economics seems to enjoy primacy as the underpinning of U.S. copyright law. 6

2. – Setting the Stage for a Revaluation

Yet despite the seemingly unassailable pedigree of that hoary wisdom, it is subject to challenge on various bases. First, one could scrutinize either French or U.S. law to deconstruct the Procrustean bed offered above. French law, for instance, has not always been as overtly author-centric as its current boosters maintain. 7 Plus, a Continental concern with “natural rights” is itself not unknown on American shores. 8 Alternatively, one could broaden the perspective to view each legal system as encompassing a host of features that, in the aggregate, lead to debunking “the so-called superiority of French copyright law to American copyright law in terms of fairness and morality.” 9

The current essay forms part of that revaluation. It challenges the gospel of the utilitarianism foundation of U.S. copyright law.

The current essay forms part of that revaluation. It challenges the gospel of the utilitarianism foundation of U.S. copyright law. In the process, it dethrones economics as the governing principle of that law. The approach here is purely descriptive. In other words, the current investigation sets aside any prescriptive concern over whether sound copyright laws are best rooted in the economics of incentives; in principle of natural justice; in cultural concerns of fostering creativity or social considerations of fostering group cohesion; or in any other alternative basis. 10 Instead, the objective here is to discover what values actually undergird U.S. copyright as it has been legislatively enacted and judicially upheld, regardless of the pious formulations that lawmakers and judges may ritually incant.

3. – Curious Lack of Empirical Data

Given that the entire constitutional rationale for copyright protection is to “promote the Progress of Science,” 11 one would expect to find an economic metric in answer to the question how well copyright succeeds in fulfilling its instrumental goal of fostering creativity. 12 Already by mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court had noted, “The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards, commensurate with the services rendered.” 13 Decades later, the Court quoted that language again, this time adding, “By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” 14

Alexandre Dumas

© Wikimedia Commons.

William Shakespeare

© Wikimedia Commons.

For whose benefit does that incentive run? On the surface, it seems designed to reward authors. But that reward is itself instrumental towards a more fundamental desideratum. To quote the Supreme Court again, “The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.” 15 Under that view, the goal is to serve “the popular good, whereby works are relegated to the public domain to become the heritage of all humanity and copyright is simply a temporary way station to reward authors on the road to that greater good.” 16

Given its foundation in markets and rewards, copyright would seem to be “a natural field for economic analysis of law.” 17 Confounding those expectations, however, the discipline of economics has “rarely played a significant role in the copyright law and policymaking process.” 18 That failure of influence certainly cannot be attributed to scholarly inattention in American law reviews. 19 A vast body of books and articles plow the field, furrow by furrow. 20 (This examination barely scratches the surface of that corpus.) 21 Rival schools clash in their articulation of which theory best describes the results reached by courts, or the results that normatively should govern. 22

Part of the problem of applying economic theory to copyright doctrine is practical, arising out of the jargon in the former field – few are the copyright professionals who are able “to penetrate the mathematical expressions that often pervade the academic economic literature.” 23 But a more fundamental problem of the disconnect would seem to be conceptual – the utilitarian basis of copyright protection usually operates more as a base-line assumption than as an empirical proposition to be tested via experimentation. Lawmakers and judges have deeply entrenched views about human behavior, including about what stimuli will produce which results. A briefcase full of purported studies, along with the testimony of multiple experts steeped in the “dismal science,” cannot necessarily dislodge those perspectives. Whether that orientation itself should be lamented or celebrated raises a meta-economic issue, 24 which lies afield from the descriptive framework already announced above as the present goal. 25

4. – Copyright Subject Matter

Let us first train our magnifying glass on the scope of works that are eligible for copyright protection. To the extent that U.S. copyright law is constitutionally limited by its utilitarian orientation, one would expect Congress to embrace within protection only those works that its grant of rights would incentivize – and for courts to rule unconstitutional any protection exceeding those boundaries. Yet the actual terrain appears far different.

Private correspondence attracts copyright protection under governing U.S. law. 26 It seems evident that epistle-writers and diarists compose out of motivations far afield from those animating novelists and composers, raising doubts whether this protection rests on secure economic footing. 27 In an era in which email has become ubiquitous, 28 the potential for mischief should not be underestimated by litigants who choose to focus their grievances on the erstwhile copying of their correspondence. (Nonetheless, one recent book’s claim that an ordinary American may be liable for USD 4.5 billion in statutory damages annually on that basis would seem preposterous.) 29

The law follows its own path, regardless of how instrumental it may or may not be to reach copyright’s nominal utilitarian destination.

The same considerations could be brought to bear across the range of copyrightable subject matter. One may reasonably inquire whether drafters of insurance contracts, of legal briefs, of appliance warranties, and of advertising copy require copyright protection to practice their métiers. 30 In sum, copyright protection for letters, briefs, ads, and the like rest on a wobbly foundation from an incentives perspective.

On the opposite side of the coin, U.S. copyright protection fails to reach a number of domains, such as sports plays, typeface designs, dress designs, and recipes. 31 It is fascinating to note that each one of them has developed its own mechanisms for rewarding creativity (and punishing copiers). 32 Even more pointed is the question whether software belongs under the copyright rubric. 33 Despite the cogency of all these theoretical points, the law follows its own path, regardless of how instrumental it may or may not be to reach copyright’s nominal utilitarian destination.

5. – Copyright Duration

Further questions arise whether copyright duration serves the purpose of incentivizing the creation of works of authorship. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 34 five laureates of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences joined a dozen other economists in a brief amicus curiae to the United States Supreme Court to condemn the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act [CTEA]. 35 In support of petitioner Eric Eldred, those seventeen scholars concluded that the deadweight loss from the amendment outweighed any of its economic benefits, resulting in a net loss in consumer welfare.

Comparing the main economic benefits and costs of the CTEA, it is difficult to understand term extension for both existing and new works as an efficiency-enhancing measure. Term extension in existing works provides no additional incentive to create new works and imposes several kinds of additional costs. Term extension for new works induces new costs and benefits that are too small in present-value terms to have much economic effect. As a policy to promote consumer welfare, the CTEA fares even worse, given the large transfer of resources from consumers to copyright holders. 36

Only one dissenter picked up on the economists’ point:

What copyright-related benefits might justify the statute’s extension of copyright protection? First, no one could reasonably conclude that copyright’s traditional economic rationale applies here. The extension will not act as an economic spur encouraging authors to create new works. No potential author can reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will survive commercially long enough for the copyright extension to matter. After all, if, after 55 to 75 years, only 2% of all copyrights retain commercial value, the percentage surviving after 75 years or more (a typical pre-extension copyright term) – must be far smaller. And any remaining monetary incentive is diminished dramatically by the fact that the relevant royalties will not arrive until 75 years or more into the future, when, not the author, but distant heirs, or shareholders in a successor corporation, will receive them. Using assumptions about the time value of money provided us by a group of economists (including five Nobel prize winners), it seems fair to say that, for example, a 1% likelihood of earning USD 100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future, is worth less than seven cents today.

What potential Shakespeare, Wharton, or Hemingway would be moved by such a sum? What monetarily motivated Melville would not realize that he could do better for his grandchildren by putting a few dollars into an interest-bearing bank account? The Court itself finds no evidence to the contrary. It refers to testimony before Congress (1) that the copyright system’s incentives encourage creation, and (2) (referring to Noah Webster) that income earned from one work can help support an artist who “continues to create.” But the first of these amounts to no more than a set of undeniably true propositions about the value of incentives in general. And the applicability of the second to this Act is mysterious. How will extension help today’s Noah Webster create new works 50 years after his death? Or is that hypothetical Webster supposed to support himself with the extension’s present discounted value, i.e., a few pennies? Or (to change the metaphor) is the argument that Dumas fils would have written more books had Dumas père’s Three Musketeers earned more royalties? 37

Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion responded in a footnote:

Justice Breyer nevertheless insists that the “economic effect” of the CTEA is to make the copyright term “virtually perpetual.” Relying on formulas and assumptions provided in an amicus brief supporting petitioners, he stresses that the CTEA creates a copyright term worth 99.8% of the value of a perpetual copyright. If Justice Breyer’s calculations were a basis for holding the CTEA unconstitutional, then the 1976 Act would surely fall as well, for—under the same assumptions he indulges—the term set by that Act secures 99.4% of the value of a perpetual term. Indeed, on that analysis even the “limited” character of the 1909 (97.7%) and 1831 (94.1%) Acts might be suspect. 38

That footnotes concluded, “Justice Breyer several times places the Founding Fathers on his side. It is doubtful, however, that those architects of our Nation, in framing the ‘limited Times’ prescription, thought in terms of the calculator rather than the calendar.” 39 In sum, the economists made no headway with the Court, which upheld respondent’s defense of the amendment. Economic expertise thus counted for naught at the end of the day.

In sum, economists consistently call for copyright terms to be shortened. Far from heeding those pleas, Congress has consistently expanded the term – being affirmed at every juncture by the Supreme Court.

The next time that the Supreme Court confronted these issues arose in the context of works resurrected from the public domain. In Golan v. Holder, 40 the majority clarified that copyright protection is founded on an incentive not only to create but also to disseminate. 41 It upheld the conferral of U.S. copyright protection on public domain works emanating from abroad, holding that adherence to the Berne Convention, undertaken in an exemplary fashion in order to impress on other nations the extent to which the United States adheres to the discipline of world trade, serves the larger objectives of the Copyright Clause as set forth in the Constitution. 42 In that context, six justices rejected the dissenting view of Justices Breyer and Alito 43 that the ruling thereby removed copyright protection “from the special economic circumstances that surround the nonrepeatable costs of the initial creation of a ‘Writing’.” 44 Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion responded by quoting the Court’s previous recognition that “copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” 45 The dissent further riposted 46 with long quotations from Thomas Jefferson, concluding that he (along with James Madison) championed a “utilitarian understanding of the Copyright Clause,” which stands “in contrast to the ‘natural rights’ view underlying much of continental European copyright law.” 47 Without itself overtly departing from such a utilitarian understanding, 48 the majority rejected the dissent’s “isolationist reading.” 49

In sum, economists consistently call for copyright terms to be shortened. Far from heeding those pleas, Congress has consistently expanded the term – being affirmed at every juncture by the Supreme Court. Thus does the disparity between the disciplines of copyright and the incentives purportedly offered by economics yawn wide. 50 In short, the universal rhetoric invoked to justify copyright protection fails to account for the actuality of the field. 51

1. B. EDELMAN, La Propriété Littéraire et Artistique, 2nd